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"'Diamonds are forever' it is often said. But lives are not. We must
spare people the ordeal of war, mutilations and death for the sake
of conflict diamonds."
-Martin Chungong Ayafor, Chairman of the Sierra Leone Panel
of Experts.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the world reacts to and combats terrorism, the notion
that the United Nations ("U.N."), United States, and other lead-
ing countries of the world should divert resources from the war
against terrorism to combat the illicit diamond trade may seem
misdirected. However, it has been documented that such terror
groups as Al Qaida, Hamas, and Hezbollah are actively involved
in, and profit from, the illicit diamond trade.1 Diamonds pro-
vide a fungible commodity that are in demand, extremely liq-
uid, and poorly regulated, 2 despite the best efforts of the U.N. 3
Moving resources or capital away from the war front and invest-
ing some of those resources into combating the illegal diamond
trade would not only combat terrorism but also help eradicate
the human rights atrocities associated with this trade. 4 This
1 See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (stating
that evidence shows that A1-Qaeda international terrorist network and other re-
lated groups profit from the conflict diamond trade); see also Conflict Diamonds:
Hearing before the subcomm. on trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th
Cong. 9 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. Mike Dewine, U.S. Sena-
tor from Ohio); Holly Burkhalter, Blood on the Diamonds, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2001, at A23; Douglas Farah, Digging up Congo's Dirty Gems; Officials Say Dia-
mond Trade Funds Radical Islamic Groups, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2001, at Al
(stating that radical Islamic organizations, including Osama bin Laden's Al Qaida
network deal in diamonds).
2 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 46 (statement by Rory E. Anderson, Govern-
ment Relations Manager, and Africa Policy Specialist, World Vision United
States).
3 For Angola, see U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3891st mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173
(1998). ; SC Res. 1176 (June 24, 1998). For Sierra Leone, see SC Res. 1306 (July 5,
2000), SC Res. 1343 (Mar. 7, 2001).
4 See Michael Dynes, West Side Boys are Jungle Brigands, TIMES (LONDON),
Aug. 28, 2000, at 4 (stating that that teenage boys are given cocaine and alcohol to
make killing easier); see also Douglas Farah, Children Forced to kill; Sierra Leone's
Ex Fighters Try to Recover Stolen Youth, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2000, at Al
(reporting that older rebel fighters cut children's faces and then put cocaine and
gunpowder into those cuts to give them courage); Janine di Giovanni, Girl's Seven
Years as Slave of Rebel Forces, TIMES (LONDON), May 13, 2000, at 4 (describing an
11 year old girl's 7 year ordeal as a forced combatant and sexual slave); Sam Kiley,
In the Heart of Darkness, TIMES (LONDON), May 10, 2000, at 6-7 (reporting that
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comment examines the illicit diamond trade, using Angola as a
case study5 and suggests that if the controls and regulations al-
ready in place lack effective enforcement measures, the United
States can prosecute those associated with the illegal diamond
trade under the USA Patriot Act.6 Part II of this comment de-
fines what "conflict diamonds" are, and describes the structur-
ing of the world diamond market. An analysis of how the
conflict diamond crisis affects the citizens of Angola and, in
turn, the world diamond industry, will demonstrate the need for
stricter controls and regulation. Part III discusses the global
response to the conflict diamond trade. By examining and ana-
lyzing the various resolutions passed by the U.N., including the
adoption of the Kimberley Process, as well as legislation en-
acted by the World Diamond Council and Congress's proposed
Clean Diamond Trade Act, 7 it is clear that stricter and more
effective controls are needed. Finally, Part IV suggests that the
USA Patriot Act provides a legal basis in which the United
States can take the lead in eradicating the conflict diamond
trade as well as combating terrorism.
II. BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT DIAMONDS
A. What are Conflict Diamonds?
Conflict diamonds are "diamonds that originate from areas
controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and inter-
nationally recognized governments, and are used to fund mili-
rebels would ask their vitims if they wanted "long sleeve or short sleeve" before
cutting off their arms); Barbara Crossette, In West Africa, a Grisly Extension of
Rebel Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at Al (stating that rebels would amputate
civilian hands so that they could not vote); see generally Steve Coll, The Other War:
The Grauitous Cruelties Against Civilians in Sierra Leone last Year Rivaled Those
Committed in Kosovo at the Same Time, WASH POST. MAG., Jan 9, 200 at W9.
5 Please note that although the trade of Angolan conflict diamonds has de-
creased dramatically in recent years, Angola provides a favorable lens that illus-
trates what other third world countries that are rich in diamond resources have
had to deal with. The Angolan example also illustrates the international reaction
to the illegal diamond trade. By way of example, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the
Republic of Congo are also countries that share many of the same problems as
those facing Angola.
6 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act].
7 See Clean Diamond Trade Act of 2001, S. 2027, 107th Cong. (2002) [herein-
after CDTA].
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tary action in opposition to those governments, or in
contravention of the decision of the [U.N.] Security Council."
Once mined, these diamonds are sold as rough uncut diamonds
on the black market and "provide the funding for rebel move-
ments to purchase illicit arms, to support rebel armies, and to
prolong civil wars that have terrorized societies and destroyed
communities."9
Commentators believe the conflict diamond trade accounts
for roughly four percent of the world diamond trade10 and has
been valued at over ten billion dollars during the last decade."
Once sold, cut, and polished these conflict diamonds become vir-
tually untraceable, 12 eventually reaching a customer who un-
knowingly has aided the funding and promotion of civil unrest
or terrorism. The events of September 11, 2001 and other ter-
rorist acts that have occurred since then, illustrate the need for
effective regulation and prosecution in all aspects in the war on
terror. This includes the trade of conflict diamonds.
B. The Structure of the World Diamond Market
Today the total world production of diamonds is a multi-
billion dollar industry. 13 As of 1999, "$3.8 billion [of diamonds
8 Conflict Diamonds, Sanctions and War, at http://www.un.org/peace/africa
Diamond.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Conflict Diamonds].
9 Hearings, supra note 1 at 23 (statement of Alan Eastham, Special Negotia-
tor for Conflict Diamonds, U.S. Dept. of State); see also Conflict Diamonds, supra
note 6; Lucinda Saunders, Note: Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: Holding
De Beers Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1402,
1411 (2001).
10 See Hearings, supra note 1 at 25 (statement of Alan Eastham, Special Ne-
gotiator for Conflict Diamonds, U.S. Dept. of State); see also Kelly Kleiman, Price
is Too High for Some Gems, Groups Say, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2001, at S1 (stating
that De Beers estimates conflict diamond trade as four percent of total diamond
trade); Kate Dunn, Tainted Gems Lose Sparkle as Prices Fall, CHRISTIAN ScI. MON-
ITOR, Oct. 27, 2001 at 1 (claiming that conflict diamonds represent roughly four to
fifteen percent of the world diamond trade).
11 See Hearings, supra note 1 at 10 (statement of Hon. Mike De Wine, U.S.
Senator from Ohio).
12 See Conflict Diamonds, supra note 6; see also Hearings, supra note 1, at 29
(statement of James Mendenhall, Deputy General Counsel, Office of the United
States Trade Representative).
13 See GLOBAL WITNESS LTD., CONFLICT DIAMONDS: POSSIBILITIES FOR THE
IDENTIFICATION, CERTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF DIAMONDS 2 (2000) [hereinafter
Global Witness Report]; see also GEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA Chapter 11
(1994) [hereinafter G.I.A.].
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came] from countries that were well regulated, namely, South
Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Canada, and Australia"14 while
roughly $3.2 billion have come from countries, mostly in sub-
Saharan Africa, where diamond controls regarding extraction
and exporting were loosely regulated. 15 It is in these latter
countries, where there is a lack of governmental controls in the
diamond extraction and export process that the black market
for conflict diamonds has flourished. 16 A basic understanding of
the structure of the world diamond market and identification of
the parties involved will make the need for stricter controls at
the point of extraction and export self-evident. Implementing
stricter controls will ensure that the citizens of these developing
nations will benefit, instead of suffer, from their countries' vast
natural resources.
1. Selling through the Central Selling Organization ("CSO")
The majority of the world's diamonds are mined by only a
handful of companies, the most prominent and historic being
DeBeers.17 DeBeers mines approximately 50% of world produc-
tion either through its subsidiaries or via joint partnership with
a host government in return for financial or technological con-
siderations.' 8 The structure of the world diamond market, be-
14 See Global Witness Report, supra note 11, at 3.
15 See id; see also Hearings, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Alan Eastham,
Special Negotiator for Conflict Diamonds, U.S. Dept. of State).
16 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Hon. Tony P. Hall, Repre-
sentative from Ohio) (stating that even with U.N. sanctions imposed against Si-
erra Leon and Angola, UNITA still earns $100 million each year from selling
diamonds); see also G.I.A. supra note 8, ch. 11; see generally Global Witness Re-
port, supra note 8.
17 In 1860 the DeBeers brothers bought a farm in South Africa's northern
cape province for just 50 pounds, it later became the site of the now famous Kim-
berley Mine. In 1888, DeBeers Consolidated Mines Limited was established, at
the Kimberley Mine, thus beginning the modern diamond industry. Since the es-
tablishment of the DeBeers Consolidated Mines Limited, DeBeers has established
a conglomerate including Debswana, a joint venture with the country of Botswana
which became the countries leading private employer, as well as the Central Sell-
ing Organization, and just recently has partnered with LVMH, the luxury goods
maker, to open DeBeers stores worldwide. See DeBeers: A History of Diamonds at
http://www.debeers.com/html/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
18 See Global Witness Report, supra note 11, at 3; see also G.I.A., supra note
11, ch. 12 at 4. DeBeers through the Central Selling Organization enters formal
partnerships with developing countries which lack mining expertise and other
technologies and provides financing in return for long term contracts. Id. Exam-
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cause of its relatively few major players, is unlike anything else
in the business world. 19 It seeks to bring together all mined
diamonds to a few central locations, namely London and Ant-
werp, in order to ensure stability of diamond prices.20 Moreo-
ver, its business structure has been described as a "cartel," an
"incomplete collective monopoly" and a "producer's coopera-
tive. ' 21 The world diamond trade can be best understood by
visualizing the market as a pipeline. 22 Specifically, major dia-
mond producing companies and countries that are properly li-
censed and regulated sell most of their product to the Central
Selling Organization ("CSO").23 For all intents and purposes
the CSO is operated by DeBeers, 24 and is believed to buy and
market roughly 80% of the world's output of rough diamonds. 25
After purchasing the rough stones, the CSO then sorts and
grades each stone.26 Once the rough stones have been graded,
they are put up for sale at one of ten annual sales. Each sale is
commonly referred to as a "sight."27 However, prior to each
ples include the 50-50 partnership between DeBeers with Botswana forming Deb-
swana and Agreement with Angola where it will sell 70-80 percent of its
production through the Central Selling Organization in exchange for $50 million
and technical assistance.
19 See G.I.A., supra note 11, ch. 12, at 2. Although there are other mining
companies, DeBeers because of its immense wealth, influence and role in the CSO
generally allows it to control the sale of the rough diamond market. See id. at 5-7.
20 See id. ch.12 at 1. Before the CSO, the diamond trade was operated by a
group known as the 'Syndicate' which consisted of 10 companies and was the
brainchild of Cecil Rhodes, the first chairman of DeBeers. See G.I.A., supra note
11, ch. 11, at 14. Mr. Rhodes and the others realized that only by concentrating
production through one company could the diamond price and profits remain sta-
ble. See id. at 11.
21 Id. ch. 12 at 2.
22 See id. ch. 12 at 3 (illustration).
23 See id. ch. 12 at 2-4.
24 See G.I.A., supra note 11, ch.12 at 2-4. The CSO is primarily operated by
the Diamond Corporation (DiCorp) and the Diamond Trading Company ('DTC').
See id. The Diamond Corporation is controlled by one of DeBeers subsidiaries,
CDM, and acts as the purchasing arm of the organization and buys over 14 tons of
rough diamonds - approximately 650 million stones- each year accounting for
roughly 80 percent of the world diamond production. See id. See also GLOBAL WIT-
NESS LTD., Is THE PRICE OF DIAMONDS TOO HIGH? How ANGOLA'S RETURN TO WAR
HAS BEEN FUNDED BY THE INTERNTIONAL DIAMOND TRADE (Dec.14, 1998).
25 See G.I.A. supra note 11, ch. 12, at 10.
26 See G.I.A., supra note 11, ch. 12, at 7. Each stone is graded into over 5,000
different industry known categories. See id.
27 See id. ch. 12, at 7.
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sale, each invited buyer, known as a sightholder,28 consults
with an individual broker 29 who acts as an intermediary relay-
ing information between the CSO and the sightholder about the
particular quantity and quality of diamond sought.30 The CSO
then picks out an allotment of diamonds attempting to match
each individual sightholder's request with the diamonds on
hand and offers them for sale at the sight. 31 Generally, the
sightholder purchases the entire lot even if specifications do not
match exactly. 32 After the sale, sightholders generally send
their stones to Antwerp, a major cutting and trading center, 33
where it is estimated that 80% of rough diamonds and more
than 50% of the polished diamonds pass through before
diamonds are then again sold to other manufacturers. 34 Once
the diamonds are sold and cut in Antwerp, these manufacturers
then transport their diamonds to the other diamonds centers
around the world, namely Tel Aviv, Bombay, New York, Am-
sterdam, and Johannesburg for technical cutting and eventual
sale.35
In theory, the CSO model works well, in that it seems cen-
tralized and claims to only conduct business with legally li-
censed countries and companies. However, a closer
examination reveals otherwise. In order to gain more of the
market share and thus preserve and promote market stability
and price, the CSO purchases rough diamonds from intermedi-
28 See id. Today there are roughly 160 sightholders worldwide. Sightholders
are generally companies that serve certain markets, meet certain qualifications
regarding financial strength, attitude, and other CSO qualifications. Membership
is extremely prestigious and new members must demonstrate that they would not
crowd the already established field and would serve a new underdeveloped mar-
ket. See id.
29 See G.I.A., supra note 11, ch. 12, at 8-9. There are roughly five independent
brokerage firms in the world and act to keep the sightholders and informed of CSO
policies and pass along sightholder requests. See id. at 8.
30 See id. at ch. 12, at 9.
31 See id.
32 See id. However, in 1978 all 56 Indian sightholders refused their allot-
ment. Id.
33 See G.I.A., supra note 11, ch. 12, at 10-11. Sightholders must pay for their
diamonds within 7 days and must pay in cash. See id. at ch. 12, at 9.
34 See Global Witness Report, supra note 11, at 3; see also Hearings, supra
note 1 at 5 (statement of Hon. Philip M. Crane, Representative from Illinois) (stat-
ing that 85% of the world's rough diamonds pass through Antwep, and the CSO
offices in London); G.I.A., supra note 11, ch. 12 at 10-11.
35 See G.I.A., supra note 11, ch. 12, at 10-11.
20031
7
PACE INT'L L. REV.
ate dealers and individual exporters, who may be licensed, but
will not expect their own sellers to be licensed or follow all ap-
plicable laws. 36 The CSO also has set up buying offices in the
"jungle towns" of Africa, where it pays CSO prices, in order to
maintain its overall market presence and to ensure price stabil-
ity.3 7 The CSO reasoning for setting up local offices in "jungle
towns" is twofold. First, the CSO claims that because mining in
these areas of Africa is largely alluvial and done by individual
diggers, it makes it difficult to buy on a contractual basis.38
Secondly, setting up these local offices ensures that less devel-
oped countries, which could not otherwise provide security and
transit of diamonds, get their diamonds to the CSO. 39 These
offices outside the CSO headquarters ensure that the world dia-
mond market remain stable.40 However, there remains a per-
centage of the rough world diamond market share that does not
contract with the CSO.41
2. Selling outside of the CSO
Roughly 20% of the world's rough diamonds come from
outside the CSO from diamond centers located in Geneva,
South America, the former Soviet Union, and South Africa.42
Although separate from the CSO "proper," most rough
diamonds sold in these markets eventually end up at the CSO
because these outside markets are either controlled by DeBeers
though one of its subsidiaries 43 or are purchased by the CSO
through a buying office located near these other markets. 44
This model of the world diamond market, although seem-
ingly centralized through the CSO, illustrates that outside
those direct sellers in London and Antwerp where regulations
and guidelines may be strictly followed, there remains an area
36 See G.I.A., supra note 11, ch 12, at 10.
37 See id. ch. 12, at 5.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See G.I.A. supra note 11, ch 12, at 10
41 Id.
42 See id. ch 12, at 10.
43 See G.I.A., supra note 13, ch. 12 at 11. For example, "De Beers established
a subsidiary, Centenary AG, in Geneva to handle its substantial non-South Afri-
can interests. [The former Soviet Union,] has also signed a contract with Cente-
nary AG." Id.
44 See id.ch 12, at 10.
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where the CSO guidelines are not enforced. In fact, in October
of 1997, Gary Ralfe, DeBeers' CEO stated:
Unita ... has over the recent few years been responsible for most
of the production in Angola. One of the essential jobs that we
DeBeers [sic] carry out worldwide is to ensure that diamonds com-
ing onto the markets do not threaten the overall price structure
* . . there is no doubt that we buy many of those diamonds that
emanate from the Unita held areas of Angola.45
This statement undoubtedly illustrates that maintaining
overall price structure and profitability remains the driving
force of the CSO, while the trade of conflict diamonds and the
ramifications on those African nations where the diamond trade
drives civil unrest and human rights atrocities remains a dis-
tant second.
C. Political and Historical Landscape of Angola
Although a new government has been appointed in Angola
and the prospect of a lasting peace seems realistic, 46 the Ango-
lan struggle typifies the problems the diamond industry faces
when combating the conflict diamond trade. An overview of the
Angolan struggle illustrates the central role conflict diamonds
play in financing civil unrest, as well as the human rights asso-
ciated with these insurgencies.47
45 Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 8.
46 See Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA- Action for Southern Af-
rica, Issue no 4. Vol. IX Jan. 8, 2003 available at http://www/actsa/org/Angola/
apm0904.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
47 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions at para. 165 (maintaining UNITA has ability to continue
fighting through diamond sales); see also Christopher McDougall, In Angola,
Diamonds are a Struggling Smuggler's Best Friend, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1993 at
A9 (stating that UNITA and other insurgent groups in Angola control the coun-
tries diamond mines); Bob Drogin, Rebels, Soldiers and Freelancers Rush to Dig
Up and Incompara. ble Treasure, Straining a Fragile Truce, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13,
1996 at Al (reporting that revenue from the diamond trade provide weapons and
food to UNITA's soldiers).
2003]
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1. Angola in the Twentieth Century
Prior to gaining its independence in 1975, Angola was a col-
ony of Portugal for most of the Twentieth Century.48 Portugal
considered Angola an essential part of the Portuguese nation 49
because it was Portugal's primary source of slaves during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 50 In later years, Angola
provided Portugal with coffee, diamonds, and oil.51 Although
this created a lucrative relationship for Portugal, Angolans
viewed colonial rule as a "rigid dictatorship and exploitation of
African labor. '52 As a result of these exploitations, a strong
sense of nationalism formed within the population.5 3
The nationalistic movement was led by three distinct par-
ties, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
("MPLA"), the National Front of Liberation of Angola ("FNLA"),
and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
("UNITA").5 4 Each of these three groups drew from separate
and distinct segments of the population.
The MPLA was founded in 1956 and drew its support from
the cities and professed a strong Marxist ideology. 55 Whereas
48 The Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), Background Paper: Angola
Paper 001, Mar. 1995 at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/009.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2003).
49 Id. See also INGE TVEDTEN, ANGOLA: STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND RECON-
STRUCTION, 23-26 (1997) (examining Portuguese expansion in Angola and Portu-
guese Colonial Act of 1930); JOHN MARCUM, THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION VOLUME I:
THE ANATOMY OF AN EXPLOSION (1950-1962), 4 (1969) (claiming that Portuguese
controlled Angolan territory gained importance on the national agenda).
50 See Saunder supra note 9; see also MARCUM, supra note 49, at 2 (Portugal
exported 3,000,0000 Angolans as slaves between 1580 and 1836); TVEDTEN, supra
note 49, at 18 (noting Angola suffered heavier loss of population due to slave trade
than any other African nation).
51 See The Africa Policy Information Center, supra note 48.
52 The Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), Background Paper: Angola
Paper 001, Mar. 1995 at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/009.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2003).
53 See JAMES CIMENT, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, POSTCOLONIAL WARS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA, 39 (1997) (explaining the origins of the nationalist movement in
Angola); See ANGOLA: A Country Study 3, 159 (Thomas Collelo ed., 1989); see
generally The Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), Background Paper: Angola
Paper 001, Mar. 1995 at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/009.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2003).
54 See Saunder, supra note 9, at 39.
55 See Ciment supra note 53, at 11; see also Tvedten, supra note 49, at 44; The
Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), Background Paper: Angola Paper 001,
Mar. 1995 at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/009.html (last visited Jan.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/7
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the FNLA was composed of mostly Kikongo or Bakongo people
who had significant ties to Zaire.5 6 In contrast, UNITA, the
most widely recognized and savage of the three movements,
drew its support from the largest ethnic group of Angola, the
Ovimbundu people who reside in the majority of the diamond
producing areas of Angola. 57 UNITA was led by Jonas Savimbi
whose personal political philosophy changed from Maoist to
anti-communist in order to garner the attention of the United
States during the Cold War. 58
Although unified in their struggle for independence, the al-
liance between MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA soon splintered.59
Each of the three nationalistic groups had strongly differing
ideologies of how Angola should be run and struggled for control
of the capital, Luanda.60 In 1975, prior to Portugal officially
recognizing Angolan independence, the MPLA gained control of
Luanda and became the recognized governing party of Angola.6 1
Once the MPLA gained control of Luenda, both UNITA and
FNLA, each harboring differing views of how Angola should be
19, 2003); An End to Angola's 27 years of War, AFROL NEWS, Mar. 31, 2002, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2002/0331peace.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2002).
56 See Saunder, supra note 9; see also Ciment, supra note 53, at 12 (asserting
that FNLA, whose leader had close ties with the Zairian dictator, drew its support
from the Kikongo people, most of whom lived in Zaire); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY
STUDY, supra note 53, at 27 (claiming that FNLA initially advocated for restora-
tion of Bakongo kingdom, which overlapped with Zaire, but later adopted an Ango-
lan nationalist agenda).
57 See Ciment, supra note 53, at 12 (stating that Unita was established in
central Angola in Ovimbundland because it was not represented in Angolan na-
tionalist movements); see also Lucinda Saunder, Note: Rich and Rare are the Gems
They War: Holding De Beers Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 1402, 1418 (2001).
58 See Ciment, supra note 53, at 12 (stating that Unita's agenda has been rec-
ognized as generally the expression of Savibi's personal opinions aimed at gaining
support from other areas of the world); see also Saunder, supra note 58, at 1418.
59 See The Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), Background Paper: An-
gola Paper 001, Mar. 1995 at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/009.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2003) (stating that Angola gained its independence from Por-
tugal on Nov. 11, 1975).
60 See id; see also Angola: A Country Study, supra note 53, at 159 (stating that
there was an effort to form a coalition government at the time of independence but
it failed and civil war began).
61 See Saunder, supra note 58, at 1419; see also Ciment, supra note 53, at 51.
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run, recognized that they could not defeat the MPLA alone.6 2
UNITA and FNLA then joined forces and launched a full-scale
civil war against the MPLA.6 3 Besides being a battle of compet-
ing political ideologies, the Angolan civil war became a focal
point of the Cold War. The United States, following the "con-
tainment policy" it espoused in the 1960's and followed through-
out the Cold War, supported UNITA and its democratic ideology
while the Soviet Union supported the Marxist-orientated
MPLA.64 However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end
of the Cold War, both Western and Eastern support in the
Angolan civil war diminished. Eventually, the MPLA distanced
itself from its Marxist ideologies and "any support to UNITA
was seen as prolonging the unnecessary bloodshed of civilian
Angolans."65
With the end of the Cold War, Angola was left to its own
demise. For Angola, the 1990's can best be characterized as a
series of peaceful attempts followed by a return to bloodshed.
"[I]n May 1991, after two years of talks, the Angolan govern-
ment and UNITA signed a treaty providing for a cease-fire,
troop demobilization and multi-party elections."66 In the Sep-
tember 1992 elections, judged free and fair by UN observers,
were held and the MPLA won control of the government. 67 Un-
fortunately, General Savimbi and UNITA rejected the election
results and war resumed. 68 In yet another attempt to bring
peace to Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol was signed by
UNITA and the MPLA, but once again failed three years later.
Angola's most recent attempt at peace was signified with the
62 See Tvedten, supra note 49, at 37 (reporting that the FNLA and UNITA
formed an alliance and declared a civil war).
63 See Angola: A Country Study, supra note 53, at 40, 162 (stating that both
the FNLA and UNITA joined together in an effort to establish a rival government
against the MPLA); see also Saunder, supra note 58, at 1420.
64 See An End to Angola's 27 years of War, AFROL NEWS, Mar. 31, 2002, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2002/033 lpeace.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2002).
65 Id.
66 The Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), Background Paper: Angola
Paper 001, Mar. 1995 at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37/009.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2003).
67 Id. The MPLA won 54% of the vote in legislative race and its leader Jose'
Eduardo dos Santos won the presidency receiving just less than 50% of the vote
while UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi received only 40% of the vote.
68 See Afrol News, supra note 55.
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signing of the Luena Memorandum. The Luena Memorandum
is believed to act as a supplement to the Lusaka Protocol and
came about only after the February 2002 death of UNITA
leader General Jonas Savimbi. 69 Since this time, Angola has
enjoyed a peace that many believe will be lasting.
2. The Role of Diamonds in the Angolan Civil War
Throughout Angola's civil war, UNITA's ability to control
the diamond mines financed and prolonged the war.70 Specifi-
cally, UNITA was able to control the Cuango Valley, Angola's
major diamond producing region. 71 Through a complex system
of relationships with diamond industrialists and mining compa-
nies, UNITA was able to mine and sell diamonds in exchange
for weapons and hard currency.72 The following excerpt from
the Fowler report illustrates this complex system:
UNITA sells diamonds to a smaller diamond trader, who buys Af-
rican diamonds from a range of countries and who is in contact
with UNITA's diamond traders. The trader is the agent of a
larger diamond cutter and these diamonds are moved via tax
havens from the first trader to the second. By the time they ar-
rive at their destination their origin is thoroughly concealed. 73
69 AFROL NEWS, supra note 64, Mr. Savimbi was killed in battle on February
22, 2002. The new UNITA leader General Paulo Lukamba has negotiated with the
Angola government on behalf of UNITA and helped negotiate the most recent
cease fire.
70 See S/2000/1225 supra note 47.
71 Id. at para.. 150.
72 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions at para. s 145-218. UNITA, through its diamond arm the
Ministry of National Resources (MIRNA), was able to play on the demand of the
world diamond market to forge relationships with both European and African gov-
ernments including Belgium, South Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo as
well as with diamond companies and industrialists. In return for diamonds, or
through the sale of diamonds UNITA was able to purchase weapons from east Eu-
ropean countries.
73 Id. at para. 177. See also S/2000/203 Mar. 10, 2000, Final Report on the
U.N. Panel of Experts [hereinafter The Fowler Report]. Each report thoroughly
outlines how UNITA violated U.N. sanctions through a series of relationships both
in Africa and Europe where agencies seeking to end the violence and atrocities in
Angola would act as a front for soliciting funds for the war effort. UNITA also
forged relationships with Eastern European countries in order to obtain weapons
as well as neighboring African countries, namely Liberia. Liberia would essen-
tially act as an agent for UNITA and sell its diamonds to a third party in exchange
for weapons and other supplies which it would pass along to UNITA.
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U.N. monitoring reports thoroughly outline how UNITA
was able to violate U.N. sanctions. 74 UNITA was able to main-
tain funding through various "relief agencies" in Africa and Eu-
rope.75 These "relief agencies" would publicly solicit funds to
end the violence in Angola, but would actually act as a front and
solicit funds for the war effort. 76 UNITA also forged relation-
ships with members of the diamond industry who would buy
UNITA diamonds and deliver them to diamond cutting cen-
ters.77 The major diamond cutting centers, because of a lack of
uniformity and security in import/export certificates, would
mark the diamonds as being suspicious, but would be unable to
thoroughly identify where the diamond originated from.78 Once
they were allowed into the open market, UNITA's diamonds
would be purchased with the resulting funds funneled back to
Angola to finance UNITA's military movement and prolong the
civil war in Angola.7 9 Through this complex system of relation-
74 The U.N. after learning of the human right atrocities associated with the
conflict diamond trade passed sanctions, barring members of UNITA from selling
diamonds on the open market as well as prohibiting their travel, pursuit of weap-
ons, and oil. See The Fowler Report, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
75 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions at para. 74-110. "The main actors outside Africa are found in
France, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Switzerland. One important organi-
zation is . . .the 'Commission for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in Angola'
(CJPR) [which] has representatives in three of these countries, Italy, Portugal and
Belgium." Id. at para. 79. This organization secretly lobbies for UNITA support
within these countries and solicit funds for the war effort. Id. See also The Fowler
Report, supra note 73.
76 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions at para. 74-110. "The main actors outside Africa are found in
France, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Switzerland. One important organi-
zation is . . .the 'Commission for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in Angola'
(CJPR) [which] has representatives in three of these countries, Italy, Portugal and
Belgium." Id. at para. 79. This organization secretly lobbies for UNITA support
within these countries and solicit funds for the war effort. Id. See also The Fowler
Report, supra note 73.
77 See The Fowler Report, supra note 73. "Illegal diamonds can be sold and
traded on major diamond markets, particularly... Antwerp." Id. at para. 80. See
generally S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on
Angola Sanctions.
78 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions. See also The Fowler Report, supra note 73.
79 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions. See also The Fowler Report, supra note 73. "[G]enerally
when cash is required by UNITA, the required quantity of diamonds are packaged
and either sold for cash or exchanged for the required commodities. In a typical
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ships UNITA was able to fund its civil war even with U.N. sanc-
tion in place. The trade of conflict diamonds raged.
III. THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT
DIAMOND TRADE
With an estimated 500,000 Angolans dead from civil un-
rest, and millions more displaced,80 the international commu-
nity could no longer ignore the gross human right atrocities
taking place in Angola.81 The following provides a general over-
view of the global response to the conflict diamond trade. Spe-
cifically, the U.N.'s and the World Diamond Council's reaction,
as well as the proposed Clean Diamond Act now in front of the
United States Congress.8 2
A. The U.N. Response
1. U.N. Sanctions Against Angola
As a result of the civil unrest and the human rights atroci-
ties associated with the armed conflict in Angola, the U.N. im-
posed sanctions against UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi.
8 3
These sanctions prohibited the:
arms transaction, UNITA prepares parcels of diamonds (allegedly valued between
US$4 million and US$5 million), and diamond experts provided by the arms bro-
ker and by UNITA agree on the value of each parcel based on number and quality
of stones presented. UNITA specifically seeks out arms dealers willing to accept
diamond as payment." Id. at para. 81.
80 See An End to Angola's 27 years of War, AFROL NEWS, Mar. 31, 2002, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/2002/0331peace.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2002).
81 See also Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, at http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2003). Child soldiers
were used in Angola. It was not uncommon for rebel forces to abduct children and
then force them into participating in beheadings, amputations, rape, and burning
people alive. These child soldiers were often given drugs to overcome their fear or
reluctance to fight. Girls were also used as soldiers in many parts of the world. In
addition to combat duties, girls are subject to sexual abuse and may be taken as
"wives" by rebel leaders in Angola. See id.
82 See generally Laura Forest, Note: Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Es-
tablishing A Legal Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control over the Country's
Diamond Resources, 11 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 633 (2001); Ian Martinez, Note:
Sierra Leone's "Conflict Diamonds": The Legacy of Imperial Mining Laws and Pol-
icy, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 217 (2002).
83 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions at para. 3. See also S/RES 864 (1993) (establishing an arms
embargo and placed petroleum sanctions against UNITA); S.C. Res. 1127, U.N.
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sale or delivery of arms and military equipment to UNITA; the
provision of petroleum products to UNITA, and the purchase of
diamonds mined in areas controlled by UNITA, require[d] the
freezing of UNITA bank accounts and financial assets and man-
date the closing of UNITA representation offices as well as re-
strictions on travel of senior UNITA officials and adult members
of their immediate families.8 4
Realizing the difficulty in monitoring the sanctions from
abroad, the U.N. also implemented a Panel of Experts to moni-
tor and report the effects of the sanctions from within Angola.8 5
The sanctions, coupled with the monitoring system, had a posi-
tive effect of slowing the trade of conflict diamonds by UNITA;
however, the sanctions were not enough.8 6 The monitoring
team realized that sanctions would only be successful if they
were "taken seriously, [and suggested] the Security Council
should consider applying sanctions against any Government
found to be intentionally violating them."8 7 Moreover, the mon-
itoring mechanism realized that in order for these sanctions to
Doc. S/RES/1127 (1997) (establishing travel sanctions on senior UNITA officials
and their immediate family members); S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1173
(1998) (requiring member states to prevent the direct or indirect import from An-
gola to their territories of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certifi-
cate of Origin regime established by the Government of Angola).
84 S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on
Angola Sanctions at para. 3. (emphasis added).
85 See Id at para. 4. The Panel of Experts was mandated to establish how
sanctions against UNITA were being violated, who was violating them and what
could be done to make the sanctions more effective. The Panel used strict eviden-
tiary standards in its investigations and allowed those parties who had helped
UNITA by violating the sanctions reply. The Panel would then report back to both
the Security Council and the General Assembly describing their findings and how
to better implement the Sanction process. Id. See also SC Resolution 864 (1993)
(outlining the general framework of the Panel Experts and how to work with the
Security Council in reporting its findings).
86 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions at para. s 145-238. Here, the report illustrates that although
sanctions were implemented against UNITA and did make it more difficult for
UNITA to trade conflict diamonds, it was still able to maintain the trade. See also
The Fowler Report, supra note 73.
87 S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on
Angola Sanctions at para. . 224. Other recommendations included that a certifica-
tion scheme as well as other standardized regulated practices be implemented for
the trade of conflict diamonds in order to stop UNITA's ability to fund their armed
conflict. See id. para. s 235-38. These suggestions were later incorporated in the
Kimberley Process.
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be truly effective there must be meaningful diamond controls
both inside and outside of Angola.8
8
Although the sanctions did decrease the volume of conflict
diamond,; reaching the market, it was not the single motivating
factor.8 9 Arguably, the Angolan trade of conflict diamonds sig-
nificantly ended with the end of the armed conflict in Angola,
which occurred as a result of the assassination of UNITA leader
Jonas Savimbi.90 After General Savimbi's death, UNITA and
the Angolan Army signed the Luena Memorandum and agreed
to "put an end to hostilities and restore peace throughout the
Angolan territory."91 Since its signing, the Luena Memoran-
dum has served as the foundation that the new Angolan govern-
ment has, used to help draft a constitution and legitimize its
authority.92
As witnessed by the Angolan example, U.N. sanctions only
significantly decreased the trade of conflict diamonds within the
country with the outbreak of peace. Although U.N. sanctions
may have been a motivating factor in bringing about the peace,
the U.N. panel of experts monitoring the sanctions stated en-
forcement would not be effective without cooperation amongst
the international community coupled with a strong movement
by many nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty In-
88 See The Fowler Report, supra note 73, para. s 94-98.
89 See generally The Fowler Report, supra note 73. See also S/200/1225 Dec.
21, 2000.
90 See An End to Angola's 27 years of War, AFROL NEWS, Mar. 31, 2002, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/ 20 0 2/0 33 lpeace.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2002). General Savimbi was killed in battle on February 22, 2002. On
March 13, 2002 the Angolan Army said it would halt all military operations
against UN]TA. Id.
91 Id. The Luena Memorandum was signed shortly thereafter and acted as a
supplement to the previously failed Lusaka Protocol signed in 1994. The signing of
the memora:adum, coupled with the statements by all factions of UNITA gave Gen-
eral Paulo Lukamba, the new leader of UNITA, a mandate to negotiate with the
Angolan government. See id.
92 See 1mgola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA- Action for Southern Af-
rica. Issue 11o. 4, Vol. IX, January 8, 2003 available at http://www.actsa.org/An-
gola/apm/apm0904.htm. Generally outlining the new governmental and
constitutional changes in the Angolan government as well as the return of millions
of refugees to their home.
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ternational and Global Witness. 93 The latter two helped lead to
the development of the recently passed Kimberley Process. 94
2. The Kimberley Process
With the Security Resolutions having only a modicum of
success, the U.N. set forth a new initiative that would attempt
to end the trade of conflict diamonds by refocusing its energies.
The U.N. set forth in a General Assembly Resolution 95 a "call on
the international community to develop detailed proposals for a
simple and workable international certification scheme for
rough diamonds based primarily on national certification
schemes and on internationally agreed minimum standards."96
This call for an international agreement and certification
scheme, led to the "Kimberley Process," the principal interna-
tional initiative established to respond to illegal conflict dia-
mond trade.97
The goals of the Kimberley Process are simply stated - end
the trade of conflict diamonds- but difficult in application.
Thus, the Kimberley Process' main thrust is to legitimize the
governments that rely on the trade of diamonds by setting forth
a regulated import and export system that will attempt to stabi-
lize the trade of diamonds in these African countries. 98 By pro-
viding a stable government, it is believed that those who have
been severely affected by the ongoing conflicts funded by the
trade in rough diamonds will be eliminated.99 The drafting and
negotiation process was chaired by South Africa, and included
about 35 participants involved in producing, process importing
and exporting rough diamonds.100 "These participants account
93 See S/2000/1225 Dec. 21, 2000. Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism
on Angola Sanctions at para. 224. See also Campaign Chronology and NGO initia-
tives available at http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/us-ngo-ini-
tiatives.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
94 See Campaign Chronology and NGO initiatives available at http://www.
globalwitness.org/campaigns/diamonds/us-ngo_initiatives.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2003).
95 See U.N. General Assembly Resolution 55/56, Dec. 1 (2000).
96 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 56/263 (Feb. 6, 2002).
97 See Frequently Asked Questions regarding the Kimberley Process at http://
mmsdl.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleyprocess/qa e.asp#10 (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
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for 98% of the global trade in and production of rough
diamonds." 0 1
After two years of debate and negotiation, the Kimberley
Process was passed on November 5, 2002 in Interlaken, Swit-
zerland. 10 2 The declaration, with U.N. approval, calls for "all
those involved in the trade of rough diamonds" to implement
the process without delay by January 1, 2003.103 Signatories to
the declaration included all of the world's leading diamond min-
ing countries, as well as the worlds largest importing and ex-
porting countries. 0 4
The general framework of the Kimberley Process is as fol-
lows: 1) each participant of the agreement will require that each
export or import of rough diamonds will be accompanied by a
forgery-proof Kimberley Process Certificate; 2) every shipment
of rough diamonds must come from a participant of the agree-
ment, if the shipment comes from a country that is not a signa-
tory of the Kimberley Process, that shipment is rejected; 3) each
signatory must designate an importing and exporting authority;
4) each party must collect and maintain relevant production,
import and export data; and 5) as required, amend and enact
appropriate laws to implement enforcement of the certification
scheme.' 0 5 Additionally, signatories will meet and discuss on
an annual basis in order to discuss the effectiveness of the Cer-
tification Scheme and implement new measures to make the
101 Id.
102 See Interlaken Declaration on the Kimberley Process, Nov. 5, 2002 availa-
ble at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/kbyl811a.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003) [here-
inafter Interlaken Declaration]; see also Press Release, World Diamond Council,
World Diamond Council Kimberley Process Implementation: Diamond Industry
Acts to End Conflict (Nov. 5, 2002).
103 See Interlaken Declaration, supra note 102.
104 The signatories were Angola, Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
Canada, C6te d'Ivoire, People's Republic of China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, the European Community, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India,
Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia,
Norway, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States
of America and Zimbabwe. Countries intending to join by the end of 2003 include
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Japan, Malta, Thailand and Ukraine. See Interlaken
Declaration, supra note 102.
105 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme at http://www.kimberleypro-
cess.comBulletinDisplay.asp?Key=38 (last visited on Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
Kimberley Certification Scheme].
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process more effective. 10 6 This scheme is thought to be the an-
swer to stopping the trade of conflict diamonds, however the
Kimberley Process goes further and discusses the need for strict
control and security measures to be implemented at the point of
origin - where the diamond is first mined. 10 7
Implementing a control scheme at the point of origin is vi-
tal to the success of the Kimberley Process. Point of origin rec-
ommendations include formally licensing all those in the
diamond mining industry, including mines, and miners - both
artisinal and informal.108 It also suggests that all rough dia-
mond buyers, sellers and exporters be licensed and keep exten-
sive records for a period of five years, including a listing of the
names of buying and selling clients and their licensing num-
bers. 10 9 However, because the Kimberley Process only "recom-
mends" and "suggests" that signatories implement these
procedures, it lacks the full force of law. As a result, the very
countries (namely Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) that the
Kimberley Process is aimed at helping may in fact actually do
nothing. These countries face a daily struggle to feed and cloth
their citizens and may not be able to enact or enforce these pro-
cedures in an effective manner. Punishment for violating these
procedures may be ineffective and difficult to enforce. Moreo-
ver, because of the relative poverty within the country, the offi-
cials in charge of licensing and enforcing may be subject to
bribery and coercion. The absence of a mandatory licensing
scheme may result in a portion of diamonds mined within these
countries being siphoned off into the same hands as before: par-
ties that fund or may fund and promote civil unrest and
terrorism.
Ultimately, for the Kimberley Process to be effective, all
signatories involved must require that licensing take place in
those countries where diamonds are mined. However, this
could possibly require an external U.N. sanctioned team to
monitor and support these systems and to ensure effective and
106 See id.
107 See Kimberely Process Working Document, July 2001. Essential Elements
of an International Scheme of Certification for Rough Diamonds at http://www.
gov.za/reports/2001/kimberley.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
108 See Kimberley Certification Scheme, supra note 105, Annex II, 9, 11.
109 See id. at Annex II, 15.
[Vol. 15:513
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/7
THE CURRENCY OF TERRORISM
adequate enforcement and punishment for violation of the Kim-
berley Process.
B. The World Diamond Council's Response
The diamond industry, through the World Diamond Coun-
cil ("WDC"), seeks to comply with the U.N. and other govern-
mental organizations to ensure that conflict diamonds are
excluded from the legitimate diamond trade. 110 Due to growing
external pressures on the diamond trade, on October 17, 2000
the WDC developed a system for international rough diamond
controls. 1 ' The WDC believes that conflict diamonds, gener-
ally traded as rough diamonds, cannot be identified through
physical inspection. 112 Therefore, the inability to identify rough
diamonds suggests that many conflict diamonds pass or are
laundered through countries not generally associated with the
conflict diamond trade. 1 3 The WDC suggests that the best way
to ensure that conflict diamonds do not reach the market is to
set up a system of export and import verifications. 114
Similar to the Kimberley Process, the WDC proposes that
only those countries that implement strict rough diamond ex-
port and import controls should be allowed to market." 5 In or-
der for a country to be considered to have such controls, it would
have to meet the export and import controls listed below.
1. Export Controls
Under the WDC's proposal, all rough diamonds must be
packaged for export in a "sealed, transparent, and tamperproof
security bag by a government official in the exporting coun-
try. 1" 6 The security bags would include a visible Certificate of
Export Origin along with an Import Confirmation Certificate
110 See World Diamond Council Technical Committee, A System for Interna-
tional Rough Diamond Export and Import Controls, (Oct. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.worddiamondcouncil.comsystem.shtml (on file with Author) [hereinaf-
ter WDC].
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See WDC, supra note 110.
116 See id.
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and a Security Slip. 117 These documents would meet tamper
and forgery resistant requirements as set forth by the U.N. and
may also include watermarked security paper as well as contain
a unique export registration number.'18 Each individual secur-
ity bag would also state the total weight and total export value
of the bag. 1 9 Prior to shipping, the shipments data would be
recorded in a government controlled database. 120 If any of these
requirements were not met prior to shipment or it had been de-
termined that the shipment had been compromised en route,
then that shipment would not be allowed into the country of
import.121
2. Import Controls
All rough diamond imports would only be accepted if they
arrived in sealed containers and met all export requirements. 122
The country of import would be able to verify the exporting
country's recordation process and enter the required informa-
tion into its own country's national database. 23 The WDC be-
lieves that implementing a meticulous recordation process,
allowing for rejection of shipments not meeting specifications
ensures that diamonds reaching the market would be conflict
free. 124
However, as this process will slow the amount of time it
takes for rough diamonds to reach the major cutting and trad-
ing centers of the world, the WDC has provided for an exemp-
tion. The WDC has proposed to set up Conflict Free Trade
Zones ("CFTZ").' 25 In these zones, diamonds may be freely im-
ported and exported between all diamond mining, manufactur-
ing and trading centers that adhere to the rough diamond
regulations concerning export and import.126 The rationale be-
hind these zones where there are strict import and export con-
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See WDC, supra note 110.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See WDC, supra note 110.
126 See id.
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trols already in place is that it would allow the diamond
industry to operate in an economically efficient manner. 127 For
example, a shipment of rough diamonds to England, which are
to be sold at the CSO, would have to meet the requirements set
forth by the WDC. However, once these diamonds are sold and
then shipped to Antwerp, New York, or Israel, for further
processing or selling, the WDC requirements would not apply
because those countries already have strict import/export con-
trols in place. It is the WDC's stated intent that their proposal
will greatly reduce, if not eradicate, the trade of conflict
diamonds worldwide.128
Although the WDC proposal basically mirrors the certifica-
tion scheme set forth in the Kimberley Process, it fails to recog-
nize that many of the diamonds that are mined may be subject
to local conflicts, bandits, and bribery. Without addressing the
point of origin question, their certification scheme would fail.
In many areas of Africa, diamonds are mined by individuals not
associated with mining companies, or if associated, only loosely.
These miners, because of economic hardship, may then sell
their diamonds to the highest bidder or be forced to sell to a
local bandit in return for safety. The result would be a loophole
in the system where those who wish to continue to finance their
illegal activities would be able to exploit the system. Therefore,
the WDC, although a worthwhile effort which provides a certifi-
cation scheme parallel to the Kimberley Process, fails to ad-
dress the most basic of questions: how to regulate and ensure
that freshly mined diamonds will immediately go to officially
licensed diamond dealers?
C. The United States' Response
The United States' diamond market makes up over half of
the world diamond market and correspondingly wields great in-
fluence on demand and market price of this global market. 29
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See Global Witness Report, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that in 1999 the
wholesale market in the United States was 48% ($6.24 billion) of the market, and
accounted for 44% ($24.6 billion) of retail jewelry sales market); see also Hearings,
supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Hon. Tony P. Hall, Representative from Ohio)(stating that the United States buys 50% of all the diamonds in the world every
year); Hearings, supra note 1, at 9 (testimony of Hon. Mike DeWine, U.S. Senator
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Therefore, it is argued that the United States bears a propor-
tionate amount of responsibility to ensure that the diamonds
reaching the market do not promote civil unrest, human right
violations, or terrorism.
The impetus for acting has never been greater as evidence
indicates that Al Qaida and other terrorist organizations are us-
ing the conflict diamond trade for financing and money launder-
ing.130 After the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in 1998, and
the resulting actions by the United States to freeze Al Qaida
and Taliban bank accounts, Al Qaida recognized its financial
vulnerabilities.' 3 ' In turn, Al Qaida saw the fungibility and li-
quidity the diamond trade would provide.1 32 Thus, by moving
into the diamond trade Al Qaida's ability to finance operations
would not be hindered. 33 A recent yearlong investigation by
the F.B.I into Al Qaida financing indicates that three Al Qaida
operatives: Aziz Nassour, a Lebanese diamond merchant;
Samih Osailly, Mr. Nassour's cousin and fellow diamond
merchant; and Ibrahim Bah, a Senegalese soldier of fortune,
have trafficked diamonds in exchange for weapons for years. 34
This investigation coupled with bank records obtained by Bel-
gian authorities stemming from the capture of Mr. Osailly illus-
trate that prior to September 11th , Mr. Osailly's diamond
company enjoyed a sudden surge in business of over $1 billion
dollars. 135 Also seized during the arrest were phone records
that showed numerous phone calls to Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq and Iran. 36 This evidence, coupled with studies conducted
for determining the feasibility of the Clean Diamond Act indi-
cate the conflict diamond trade "channel[s] billions of dollars
into black market economies turn[ing] it into easy money for
from Ohio) (stating that the United States purchases a majority of the world's
diamonds and therefore the U.S. has clout); G.I.A., supra note 13, at p. 18.
130 See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.
131 See Douglas Farah, African Nations Hosted Terror Chiefs, THE HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 29, 2002, at A29. Freezing the assets of both Al Qaida and the
Taliban after the 1998 bombings resulted in over $240 million being seized.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See id.
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terrorists... whose cells are involved in a range of money mak-
ing activities that include diamond trading."137
U.N. sanctions currently in place "are imperfect solution[s]
because they do nothing to help block the smuggling of
diamonds through other channels . . . UNITA [as of 2001
earned] $100 million a year selling its diamonds - despite the
fact that the U.N. embargo has been in place for three years."
138
If the United States does not act and take a proactive approach,
it is feared that "the trade in legitimate diamonds faces the
threat of a consumer backlash that could damage the economies
of countries not involved in the trade [ofW conflict diamonds and
penalize members of the legitimate trade and the people they
employ."'139 Such fears were recognized and led to the introduc-
tion of the Clean Diamond Trade Act ("CDTA" or "Act").
The CDTA seeks to implement and abide by all current and
future U.N. Security Council resolutions and the standards set
forth by the Kimberley Process. 140 It calls for the President of
the United States to participate in the negotiations relating to
these standards and goals 14' in order to ensure that a resolu-
tion is met in a reasonable amount of time. If a company or
country is found in violation of CDTA or of any prohibition set
forth by the Kimberley Process or U.N. Sanctions, the involved
diamonds "are subject to seizure and forfeiture laws, and all
criminal and civil laws of the United States."1 42
Also contained in the CDTA are provisions that set forth
monitoring procedures which ensure the CDTA accomplishes its
goals through a system of status reports and recommendations.
The CDTA calls for the President to submit to Congress both
137 Hearings, supra note 1, at 13 (statement by Hon. Tony Hall, Rep. from
Ohio); see also Sarah C. Aird, Legislative Focus: Ending Military Funding Through
the Diamond Trade, 8 HUM. RTS. BR. 25, 27 (2001) (stating that over the last dec-
ade the United States has sent more than $2 billion in humanitarian aid to help
people harmed by diamond related conflicts, yet over the same period rebels and
other similar militant parties have benefited from smuggling approximately $10
billion in diamonds out of the country).
138 Aird, supra note 137, at 15.
139 Clean Diamond Trade Act, S. 2027 Section 2(6), 107th Cong. (2002) [herein-
after CDTA]
140 See Id., section 4(b).
141 See Id., section 9(a) and (b).
142 Id., section 6(a).
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annual and semiannual reports 143 and for the General Account-
ing Office to report the effectiveness of the CDTA within three
years after the Act's passage.144 The annual reports will, in
part:
identif[yl those countries that have exported diamonds to the
United States during the preceding 12-month period and are not
implementing effective measures to stop trade in conflict
diamonds and whose failure to do so has significantly increased
the likelihood that conflict diamonds are being imported into the
United States. 145
The annual reports will also identify countries that are not
subject to UN sanctions, but nevertheless thought to be in viola-
tion of CDTA for participating in the conflict diamond trade. 146
Finally, the annual report will suggest the appropriate actions
the United States should take toward those countries in viola-
tion of CDTA.147
The semiannual reports will act as a supplement to the an-
nual report and focus on the countries identified in the annual
report. The semiannual reports will "explain what actions have
been taken to ensure that conflict diamonds are not being im-
ported into the United States."148 These semiannual reports on
individual countries will remain in effect until such time as the
country has implemented effective measures.149
The cost of implementing such procedures is minimal in re-
lation to the goal it seeks to achieve. Most of the implementa-
tion costs will be handled by private companies involved in the
diamond trade, pursuant to the standards set forth by the Kim-
berley Process, or are already part of the United State's import/
export control system. Additionally, the CDTA calls for five
million dollars for fiscal year 2002 and 2003 to be appropriated
to countries seeking to implement effective import/control mea-
sures aimed at ending the trade of conflict diamonds.150
143 See Id., section 7.
144 See Id., section 8.
145 CDTA, supra note 139, section 7(a).
146 See Id., section 7(a)(5).
147 See Id., section 7(a)(4).
148 Id., section 7(b).
149 See Id., section 7(b).
150 See Id., section 10.
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The passage of CDTA would convey to the world the neces-
sity of stopping the trade of conflict diamonds. The CDTA
would provide the legal framework and a system of punishment
directly aimed at the eradication of conflict diamonds in the
United States. Although passage of the CDTA would be a note-
worthy accomplishment, it faces many obstacles, namely a con-
cerned Senate that is focused on stabilizing the Middle East
and Iraq, and a partial unwillingness to implement a procedure
which will require additional funding and a concern that CDTA
will extend the government's reach and powers to parts of in-
dustry that have already made significant concessions with the
implementation of the Kimberley Process. It is then suggested
that the United States may already be able to take on a leader-
ship role and substantially halt the conflict diamond trade by
prosecuting those countries and companies under the USA Pa-
triot Act.
IV. PROSECUTION UNDER THE USA PATRIOT ACT
In the aftermath of September 11, President Bush has an-
nounced to the world that the United States is "at war with ter-
rorism."151 President Bush and Congress have also greatly
expanded the powers of law enforcementl 52 within the United
States with the goal of "smoking the terrorists out of their
holes" both domestically and abroad. 153 Prosecuting those who
151 See George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Ameri-
can People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
152 See Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079, Sept. 23, 2001 (expanding
the power of law enforcement to combat terrorism); see also USA Patriot Act, supra
note 6.
153 See George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Ameri-
can People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010916-2.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002). United State citizens have
made individual sacrifices that before September 11 were inconceivable, from go-
ing to the airport a few hours earlier in order to comply with new security mea-
sures, which includes random searches of individual passengers, to waiting in
traffic while the National Guard check individual cars for suspicious objects or
activity. These procedures have helped make the United States more secure, as
witnessed by the recent arrest of war combatant Jose Padilla who was captured
flying into Chicago O'Hare airport with plans to detonate a dirty bomb and the
arrest of Richard Reid after his attempted shoe bombing while on board a flight
from Paris to Miami. See generally Fareed Zakaria, Freedom vs. Security Delicate
Balance: The case for 'smart profiling' as a weapon in the war on terror, NEWS-
WEEK, July 8, 2002, at 27 (outlining smart profiling, and infringements upon cer-
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profit from the sale of conflict diamonds serves that goal. It has
been documented that terrorist groups, including Al Qaida,
Hamas, and Hezbollah are actively involved in, and profit from,
the illicit diamond trade. 54 From this premise it is suggested
that prosecution under the recently passed USA Patriot Act
would have a legal basis of ending the trade of conflict
diamonds and significantly crippling terrorist funding
operations.
As previously mentioned, the recently enacted Kimberley
Process as well as the proposed Clean Diamond Act would di-
rectly deal with combating the trade of conflict diamonds. How-
ever, they lack sufficient enforcement power- meaning that
violators will not face substantial criminal prosecution or be
subjected to the wave of negative media publicity that accompa-
nies terrorist related activities. The USA Patriot Act, through
its money laundering provisions, provides just such an enforce-
ment vehicle.
Prior to the USA Patriot Act, the United States' ability to
combat international money laundering was largely ineffective,
as the United States "could only issue advisories to its banks
and citizens discouraging dealings with banks or citizens of
countries with severe money laundering problems." 155 Alterna-
tively, the President could impose sanctions under the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA").156 The
results of such actions would therefore be either a mere warn-
ing or "needlessly draconian" if the sanctions were enforced. 57
One of the main purposes of the USA Patriot Act was "to
increase the strength of United States measures to prevent, de-
tect and prosecute international money laundering and the fi-
tain individual liberties during times of war while providing historical precedent to
such actions).
154 See generally supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. See also Douglas
Farah, African Nations Hosted Terror Chiefs, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 29, 2002,
at A29 (relying on a military intelligence report which outlines Al Qaida's secretive
business operations in West Africa using diamonds to buy weapons and finance
operations) [also discussed in previous section dealing with the United States re-
sponse to the trade of conflict diamonds].
155 Andres Rueda, International Money Laundering Law Enforcement and the
USA Patriot Act of 2001, 10 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 141, 144 (2001) [hereinafter
Rueda].
156 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994).
157 Rueda, supra note 155 at 145.
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nancing of terrorism."'158 Money laundering is generally defined
"as making the funds used in, or resulting from, criminal activ-
ity appear legitimate. " 159 It is from this definition that prosecu-
tion of those who trade in conflict diamonds is based. Under the
above definition, those who trade in the conflict diamonds are
acting as a money laundering agent.
Unlike previous money laundering statutes, the USA Pa-
triot Act brings in hundreds of "financial institutions" previ-
ously not within the purview of money laundering laws such as
pawnbrokers, 160 travel agencies,' 6' check cashing companies 16 2
and, most importantly, jewelers.' 63 Moreover, the Act calls for
these types of institutions to implement a system of internal
policies and controls. 64 Failure to implement effective and rea-
sonable internal controls may result in blockages and boycotts
on those financial institutions or jurisdictions, thus signifi-
cantly hindering those institution's ability to conduct busi-
ness. 165 It also expands the list of predicate offenses that may
give rise to money laundering charges to include foreign corrup-
tion (i.e. bribery, misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of
public funds), 66 meaning that funds that are deposited into an
account that bears relation to the an United States bank will
become subject to the Act.
158 USA Patriot Act § 302(b)(1) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act]. For a section by
section analysis of the money laundering aspects of the USA Patriot Act, see gener-
ally Betty Santangelo, Tim O'Neal Lorah, and Megan Elizabeth Murray, Analysis
of Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of USA Patriot (2001), at http://www.srz.
com/pubtemplate.asp?id=377 (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
159 Rueda, supra note 155 at 141 (2001).
160 See USA Patriot Act supra note 158 at § 5312(a)(2)(o), which broadly de-
fines the term "financial institution" to include "pawnbrokers."
161 See Id. at § 5312(a)(2)(q), which broadly defines the term "financial institu-
tion" to include "a travel agency."
162 See Id. at § 5312(a)(2)(r), which broadly defines the term "financial institu-
tion" to include "a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a
business in ... the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a
business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally
outside of the conventional financial institutions system."
163 See Id. at § 5312(a)(2)(n), which broadly defines the term "financial institu-
tion" to include "a dealer in precious metals, stones or jewels." For a complete list
of definitions see 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (a)(2).
164 See Id. at § 5318(h). Internal controls may include implementing compli-
ance officers, pursue ongoing employee training, and conducting independent au-
dits to test effectiveness as well as maintain adequate records.
165 See Rueda, supra note 155 at 151.
166 See generally USA Patriot Act, supra note 158.
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This latter inclusion illustrates that the Act "was designed
to have an extraterritorial impact and to strengthen money
laundering law enforcement on a global scale."1 67 The Act pro-
vides for long arm jurisdiction over any money laundered as
long as service has been given in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 168 Once it is believed that a money
laundering operation has taken place in a United States finan-
cial institution, that account may be frozen. 69 However, should
the assets lie abroad in a foreign institution that maintains an
"interbank account"170 with a United States financial institu-
tion, authorities may then seize the funds in that account.' 7'
Aside from seizure of assets, criminal penalties for violating the
Act range from a fine in the amount of three times the amount
seized to imprisonment for not more than fifteen years or
both.172
Although the United States has not yet applied the Patriot
Act to the conflict diamond trade, it has made significant pro-
gress in freezing the assets of supposed terrorist fundraising op-
erations. The United States district court for the Northern
District of Illinois recently decided Global Relief Found., Inc. v.
O'Neil'7 3 and found the actions taken by the government via the
167 Rueda, supra note 155 at 189. See also Swiss Banker Criticizes US Legisla-
tion against Terror Financing, Agence France Presse, Jan. 17, 2002 (stating that
the recently enacted USA Patriot Act interferes with other countries' ability to
conduct business).
168 See USA Patriot Act, supra note 158 at § 317. More importantly the United
States can assert jurisdiction if the asset has been laundered through or touched
any United States financial institution. Id. The offending entity or person then
must comply within a 7 day period (after notice has been received) and make avail-
able all records regarding the account as managed by the bank. See id at § 319(b);
see also Rueda supra note 155, at 190.
169 See USA Patriot Act, supra note 158 at § 311.
170 See generally USA Patriot Act, supra note 168 and accompanying text.
171 See USA Patriot Act, supra note 158 at § 319. Interbank Accounts. In gen-
eral "For the purpose of a forfeiture under this section ... if funds are deposited
into an account at a foreign bank, and that foreign bank has an interbank account
in the United States with a covered financial institution (as defined in section 5318
(j)(1) of title 31), the funds shall be deemed to have been deposited into the in-
terbank account in the United Sates and any restraining order, seizure warrant, or
arrest warrant in rem regarding the funds may be served on the covered financial
institution, and funds in the interbank account, up to the value of the funds depos-
ited in the to account at the foreign bank, may be restrained, seized or arrested."
Id.
172 See USA Patriot Act, supra note 158 at § 329.
173 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neil, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the IEEPA as
amended by the USA Patriot Act were constitutional.
Global Relief Foundation ("GRF") claimed to be an Islamic
charitable organization that provided humanitarian relief
throughout the world. 174 Through its operations, GRF allegedly
distributed food, funded schools for orphans and provided medi-
cal services, primarily to those residing in Iraq, Palestine,
Somalia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. 175
Because of increased contributions that rose from $431,155 in
1995 to nearly $3.7 million in 2000, GRF was able to open up
regional offices in some of these countries to aid in getting the
goods and services to those in need. 176 On December 14, 2001
federal agents froze the financial assets of GRF and seized
items in GRF's main U.S. office. 177 Items seized included "com-
puters and servers, modems... cassette tapes, and $13,030 in
U.S. Currency." 7 8 The government believed GRF had a rela-
tionship with the terrorists behind the events of September
11th and seized the assets pending further investigation. 179
GRF challenged these actions and argued that the order to
freeze its assets was not authorized by "statute, executive order
or the constitution" °8 0 and sought injunctive relief.'8 ' The court
after an in camera and ex parte review, held that the material
furnished by the FBI was relevant and an injunction could un-
dermine the investigation. 8 2 The court found that GRF had
not proven a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its
statutory and constitutional claims and therefore failed the
threshold factor for preliminary injunctive relief.'8 3 In this rul-
ing, the court effectively held the government's actions constitu-
174 See id. at 785
175 See Id.
176 See Id.
177 See Id.
178 Id. at 786.
179 See Id. at 785-87.
180 Id. at 785. GRF argued that the government violated the Bill of Attainder
Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause, the Due
Process Clause, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments of the
constitution. Id. at 808-09.
181 Id.
182 See Id. at 785.
183 See Id. at 809 (citing Cox v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 217, 223 (7th Cir.
1989) (citing Shaffer v. Globe Protection, Inc. 721 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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tional. More importantly, it found the USA Patriot Act and its
expanded seizure of assets provision constitutional.1 8 4
Applying the USA Patriot Act to the conflict diamond trade
will stop the trade of conflict diamonds and fight the war on
terrorism. The USA Patriot Act may work in conjunction with
the Kimberley Process. For example, a shipment of rough
diamonds may be stopped either at a United States Customs
office or abroad because it lacks certain Kimberley require-
ments or is otherwise suspicious.1 8 5 If the shipment is stopped
in United States territory, the United States has jurisdiction
over that property.' 8 6 However, even if a shipment is found
abroad, the United States may assert jurisdiction via the USA
Patriot Act.18 7 In both instances, the USA Patriot Act would
provide a vehicle for seizing the assets of the company or indi-
vidual shipping the diamonds. Like the government's actions in
Global Relief Foundation, all parties involved in the shipment
of diamonds may be subject to a full investigation as they would
fall within the expanded definition of "financial institution."'88
Freezing the assets of the company while the investigation
is ongoing would not only have a materially significant effect on
the company's ability to conduct day to day business operations
but also acts as a deterrent. Additionally, the negative publicity
associated with the seizure of assets of a well-known diamond
company or diamond dealer because of a possible connection to
terrorism would further the deterrent act as a strong deterrent.
This deterrent rationale does not take into account the pos-
sibility of any of the criminal penalties that may be levied for
violation of the USA Patriot Act. From the point of seizure, the
United States would be able to "start a chain" whereby it would
link the seized bank account to other bank accounts of individu-
als possibly connected to the trade of conflict diamonds and/or
terrorism. The net effect of such action would be a significant
decrease in the trade of conflict diamonds while also fighting
terrorism.
184 See id.
185 See generally supra note 107 and accompanying text.
186 See generally supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text (outlining the ju-
risdictional boundaries of the USA Patriot Act).
187 See id.
188 See supra note 163-164 and accompanying text outlining the definition fi-
nancial institution under the USA Patriot Act.
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V. CONCLUSION
As indicated, the trade of conflict diamonds still exists, de-
spite the best efforts of the U.N., and has been linked to funding
such terrorist groups as Al Qaida. The recent passage of the
Kimberley Process, coupled with pledges by the World Diamond
Council and the possible passage of the Clean Diamond Act in
the United States illustrate a strong desire to stop the trade of
conflict diamonds. However, these acts may not be enough. To
stop the trade of conflict diamonds, the United States, as the
world's leading consumer of diamonds and wealthiest nation,
must take the lead. The USA Patriot Act, passed to combat ter-
rorism, provides a legal vehicle that can stop the trade of con-
flict diamond while fighting terrorism without diverting
resources.
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